U nderstanding investor behavior is no easy task. The capriciousness ot htiman nature generates a seemingly endless variety of behaviors that manitt'st themselves in interesting ways when individuals pit themselves against the markets. One particular type of behavior that has emerged over the last 20 years or so is the desire to invest ethically. Our analysis of why we invest ethically goes some way toward advancing our understanditig of ethical investor behavior.
Our empirical contribution is a survey of both shareholders and prospectus requesters (who did not make purchases) of Earth Sanctuaries, Ltd., which we describe in Beal and Goyen [1998a, 1998b| . With a stated objective of conservation and a financial focus on stability rather thati maximizing shareholder returns, ESL provides an ideal opportunity to gather data to aid our understanding of ethical investor behavior.
At the time the sample for this study was selected (1999) , there were about 7,U(H) prospectus requesters and shareholders of ESL. A random sample of 1,4()(J (or 20%) was selected to survey. Corporations and overseas investors were excluded from the sample. In ;ill, 943 responses were returned, 788 from current shareholders and 155 trom prospectus requesters, tor a net response rate ot 67%.
INVESTOR MOTIVATION
A growing body ot research acknowledges that investors don't behave in the fashion that traditional finance theory typically assumes. There is evidence in particular that suggests individuals do not always act as if they were homogeneous with respect to mean-variance optimization. We look at some systematic ditferences in the way investors behave, and discuss some of the literature on ethical investment.
whicii sees investors as focused entirely on the expected returns and risk of their overall portfolios.
As Statman |20n4a] observes, Markowitz's investors are never reluctant to realize losses on stocks when tax savings are available and add to their wealth, and they do not care about dividend policy or ahout the social responsibility of the companies of which they are part owners, as long as risk and expected returns are uuatTected. Rational investors do not avt)id investment in tirnis that operate in areas or with methods that contrav'ene their personal value sets. To put this simply, personal values are irrelevant to the investment decision.
Statman |2(l()4a| also argues that hefore finance became ovenvhelmed by the notion of ratioualit\', investors were seen as normal w hen they exhihited the typical subjective reasoning ot human nature, rather than the cold calculations of the rationalists. Snyder 11957] observes that the '•normal" investors of the day could in fact increase their wealth by realizing losses and claiming tax benefits, it only they could overcome their reluctance to make the losses concrete. Snyder's investors held on to loss-making investments in the hope that one day they would recover their values, aud thus they were not inditferent between unrealized aud realized losses. In addition, by their behavior, they showed that they did not preter more to less, as they eschewed the chance to inerease total wealth by claiming tax benefits trom the capital losses. Odean 11998a|, tour decades later, reports similar findings in relation to losses.
If investors actually behave as traditional tluance theory assumes, ethical investment would exist ouly because it provides the opportunit\' tor equivalent return at lower risk or provides higher returns for the same level ot risk as standard tunds. Hence, our first proposed motivation tor ethical investment is that investors are looking tor superior hnancial performance.
Despite the concept of rationality that has dominated finance for tour decades, iu the last two of those decades authors have taken delight in pointing out that investors do not uniformly exhibit rationality. Behavioral finance draws ou concepts and evidence trom the psychology literature in an efiort to propose better explanations for fmance phenomena.
For example, well documented in psychology is the tendency ot decision-makers to be overoptimistic, to overestimate their own abilities, and to he generally overcontideut. Men appear to sutler trom these traits more than women. In the finance world, overconfidence is manifested in excessive trading (Odean [1998b|) . Barber and Odeau |20(l()| show that net returns fall as trading activity increases, and that the men in their sample traded 45% more than the women.
Other examples are confirmation bias (the tendency to tiud intorniation that reintorces ones original views and to reject other intorniation), conservatism (inability to react or slow reaction to uutolding events), anchoring, and framing.
Anchorittg occurs when a person who is asked to make a quantitative assessment can be inHueuced by irrelevant suggestions made at the same time. Tversky and Kahneman |1974] report an influential experiment showing this pheuonieiK)u; many variations have been reported in the years since with unchanged results.
Framing reters to the way a proposition is presented; the etMitext of the proposition intluences the resulting decision. Slovic [1995| summarizes nearly three decades ot empirical evidence that shows comprehensively that training changes decisions.
Research in the developing area of behavioral finance has illuminated many facets of individual investor behavior. Thaler j 1 y93| focuses on noise iu tinancial markets, price volatility, overreaction in markets, corporate finance effects (e.g., preference for cash dividends over capital gains), and individual behaviors. Noise is the opposite of news, and it makes up much ot the intormation that fuels markets. Rational investors may he stimulated to trade on news, but for every buyer there must be a seller. If potential buyers and sellers have the same information, then one side must be contemplating a trade that will prove to be an error and a trade made on noise.
Why do people trade on noise? Black [1986] asserts two reasons; First, they trade because they like trading, and, second, they don't know they are trading on noise; they think they are trading on intormation. Peterson [2002] draws on the psychology literature to show that anticipation of reward (price appreciation) generates a positive aject (emotion, mood, or attitude) that drives increased risk-taking hehavior and hLiy trading. Then, tollowing the anticipated event or news, there is a reduction iu positive affect that produces more risk-averse hehavior and drives sell trading.
Volatility' in the prices ot stocks cannot be explained merely by ehanges in the present value ot future dividends. Cuder, Poterba, and Summers [1989] show that large price movements occur in the absence of important news, and, conversely, not all potentially price-significant news results in price changes. Overreaction (and underreaction) in markets is concerned with announcement effects and the tendency of investors to over-weight recent information and imdervveight intbrniation received longer ago.
Dc Bondt and Thaler |1986] fmd stocks that had shown extreme pertbrniaiice over an extended period were likely to subsequently underpertorm (winners) iind outperform (losers). This research proved controversial in the prevailing rationalist climate. Shefrin and Statman [1985] highlight that cognitive biases aiid emotion affect investors, thus detracting from the traditionally assumed rational behavior. Normal investors often manage their stocks individually rather than as portfolios. They are reluctant to realize losses, as Snyder observed almost 30 years before, possibly because they use mental accounts, and selling a stock at a loss closes each accotmt with a hnality that allows no recovery ot value and causes emotional distress. Lease, Lewellcn, and Schlarbaum [1976|, contrary to mainstream expectations at the time, report that there is market segmentation to the extent that individual preferences can hinder the free flow ot capital and interfere with the establishment ot coherent risk-return relationships among securities. They isolate five different investor groups with ditTerent investment goals, investment approaches, and porttolio compositions. The following year, Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum |1977[ found that age, sex, income, and education affect investor preference for capital gains, dividend yield, and overall return. Warren, Stevens, and McConkey 1199 (1] again report that lifestyle and demographic tactors influence choices among asset classes. Nagy and Obenherger [ 1994] investigate the investment decision processes of equity investors with substantial holdings of U.S. Fortune 5(K) firms, and find seven summary tactors that capture the major investor concerns. Investors were asked to rank 34 variables identified as potentially attecting investment decisions as significant, considered, or ignored in the decision process. Most of the variables impacting on decisions were the traditional wealth maximization criteria such as those concerned with earnings, diversification, or risk.
Individual Investor Needs
Interestingly, the highest-ranked wealth-maximizing criterion (expected corporate earnings) was ranked as significant by loss than half the sample (46.6%). Thus, no wealth-maximizing criterion was considered important by more than half the sample. The variable coming third in the list of significant factors, "teeliiigs for firm's products and services," is decidedly an emotional and nonrational decision driver. Nagy and Obenberger [1994, p. 65] conclude that investors "use diverse criteria" and "do not approach investment decisions in a normative fashion."
Finally, Statman |2()()4b[ draws an analogy between food consumption choices and investment choices. Hoth ofter utilitarian and expressive benetits. The utilitarian benefits of food involve nutrition and flavor, while the most-favored utilitarian benefits of investment choices are high expected returns and low risk. Expressive benefits allow people to define and express their values, social class, and lifestyle choices to themselves and others. It is readily acknowledged that foods, food supply establishments, and food consumption places (restaurants) all offer expressive benefits to consumers as well as vital nutrition.
Statman contends that investments also supply expressive benefits and that most of the arguments over rationality and irrationality in investment decisions stem from the rationalists' unwillingness to acknowledge the existence and influence of expressive benefits. Statman consiciers that mean-variance optimizers (rational investors) view their porttolios as a whole, while non-rationalists build distinct layers into their pyramidal portfolios, with low-risk safety assets forming the base and more risky assets that ttilfill other purposes occupying the upper layers.
Our data support Statmans assertion. About 30% of our respondents consider that ethical investments constitute 2(t% or less of their equities porttblios. A further 10% consider their portfolios to be 100% ethical, but the majority of these respondents held shares in only Earth Santiiaries.
Social responsibility is one such "other purpose." While socially responsible porttolios are generally private matters and not proclaimed to the world, they still otfer self-signaling benefits, where investors reinforce their feelings of social responsihilit\' and generate personal emotional benetus trom their feelings ot having financially supported good things and having put their money where their mouths are. This rationale leads to our second proposed motivation for ethical investment-non-wealth returns.
Ethical or Socially Responsible Investment
Ethical or socially responsible investment (SRI) has emerged in the last decade or so as a reasonably legitimate focus of discussion about investor choice. During the 198()s, SRI was confined to the margins of the investment world and manifested itself publicly only in the establishment of a few retail mutual funds, popularly characterized as supported hy the loony left. Since that time, this force in investment has grown rapidly in importance with expanded expression to encompass retail funds, shareholder activism at annual general meetings, and SRI streams within pension funds.
Concomitant with the growth in investor support for SRI has been the development of academic interest in the phenomenon. A decade or so of academic interest has produced possibly thousands of studies in the U.S., the U.K., Canada, France, Clermany, Australia, and other cotintries arotind the world. Hiese studies have concerned:
• Definition of SRI.
• Processes of SRI or use ot screens.
• Historical returns trt)m SRI mutual funds versus conventional tunds.
• Etfect ot SRI on corporate behavior, • Identity of SRI investors.
• Why investors elioose SRI.
Rosen and Sandier 119911 report an early U.S. study ot investors in two socially screened nuitual funds. The SRI investors in their sample, when compared with other mutual tund investors (MFI), were younger, white-collar employed, better educated, and lower salaried. On average, SRI investors were 13 years younger (39 years compared with 52 years). 60%) had graduate degrees, but currently earned 15%) less than the MFls. possibly because they were in earlier stages in their careers. SRI accounted for only 49%) of their investments.
In Beal and Goyen |1998b| we study investors in aii Australian company (ESL) that openly acknowledged it had replaced wealth maximization with nature conservation as its primary motivation. We find ESL shareholders more likely to be female, to be educated to a tertiary level, and probably to a postgraduate degree level than typical shareholders ot companies listed t)n the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). They are professionally employed or retired, likely to have lower household incomes, high household assets, and a portfolio of more than 11 stocks.
In Beal and Goyen [1998a| we investigate whether investors in ESL with its unconventional mission could really be considered to be donors rather than investors. Drawing on Cullis, Lewis, and Winnett's [1992] findings that a distinction may be drawn between consumptioninvestors, who gain utility from investing ethically, and, investnieut-ini'cstors. who gain utility trom the social outcomes ot their investments, in Beal and Goyen 11998a, p. 219| we tind the vast majority of shareholder respondents meet the definition of investment-investors-they derived significant benefit from the conservation activities of the company. We concluded that "investors are tar more complex creatures than the current state of theory would suggest." Further, investors apply many criteria iti the decision-making process, although each investor weighs the criteria ditTerently. Lewis and Mackenzie [2000a] study the motivation of more than 1,000 U.K. ethical investors. They tind ethical investors to be middle-aged and middle-income activists (in politics, community, and church) with a vast majority holding mixed portfolios. Only 20% held ethical investments exclusively. This U.K. research found ethical investors to be not extremists, but merely one arm of the investment comnHinit\'.
A consistent theme of the literature reporting SRI investor characteristics and the rapid growth of SRI in many cotmtries arotind the globe is the movement of women into higher-paying jobs (and thus becoming savers and investors in ever-increasing numbers) and the influence i>f higher education. It is estimated that, in the U.S., about 60% of SRI investors are women, a far greater proportion than in the general investor population.
Scliueth [2003] complements the Australian and U.K. tuidings with the argument from the U.S. that the rapidly growing SRI industry there is fueled by better education, the appointment ot women as senior executives and directors, giving them access to power and also the ability to invest personally, and the realization that socially screened porttolios do not necessarily underperfonn the market.
MOTIVATIONS FOR ETHICAL INVESTMENT
Traditional tniance theory and the ethical investment literature together suggest three potential reasons people may invest some or all of their funds ethically:
• For superior financial returns.
• For non-wealth returns.
• To contribute to social change.
These motivations are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, but otler a starting point tor advancing our understanding ot ethical investors and the choices they make.
Is Ethical Investing a Eair Game?
It, on balance, the risk-return protiles ot SRI funcis are the sanie as for ordinary tunds, ethical investment can be considered to be a fair game. The relationship between the level of social responsibihty of a firm and its financial performance has been a contentious topic in both the academic and and professional literature and the popular press; see, for example, AH and Gold |2()()2], Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten |2(H)2|. Chan [2(H)3]. Emery |2(Kll], Johnson [20011, and Rothchild [1996] . To advance the understanding of the relationship between corporate social pertormance and corporate tmancial performance, Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes [2(H)4] conduct a meta-analysis of 52 studies. They conclude that, after considering methodological and measurement issues, the empirical analysis does suggest socially responsible tirms outperform financially. The empirical analysis ot returns and social responsibility has yet to provide a convincing causal link hetween the two tactors. A reasonable conclusion, according to the research, is that SR investments neither over-nor underperform their iion-SRI counterparts. The single objective of generating financial returns cannot theretljrc explain ethical investment.
We argue against the traditional finance theory assumption ot homogeneous mean-variance-optimizing investors. The differing levels ot intensity investors apply in the consideration ot ethics in their investing make a discussion about comparative returns and purported tradeoffs less important. To better explain the range of investments that are considered acceptable by different SRI investors, we need to move beyond the concept of financial return to a more holistic definition of utility.
Product Differentiation of SRI Funds
As the amount of investment in SRI has increased, so too have the number and variety of funds offered to investors. Bauer, Otten, and Tourani-Kad raise the possibility'' that some ethical tunds are really "conventional funds in disguise" [2004, p. 15[. If this is the case, we would expect some SRI fluids to hold portfolios that do not ditier greatly from ordinary funds. SRI funds adopting a bestof-sector investment strategy would appear to do this.
One Australian ethical investment tund has tlie stated investment objective of providing "capital growth and some income over the long term trom investment in Australian shares, while maximising the sustainability focus (economic, environmental, and social) of the portfolio" ("Westpac Australian Sustainability Share Fund" [2005] ). In fact, the maximizing ot the sustainability focus would appear to be more ot a moderating activity. The fund's advertising material advises that when necessary "we select companies with lower sustainability ratings to manage the overall risk of the portfolio." This sustainability fund is one of a suite of predominantly non-SRI options offered hy the provider. More than 50 of the funds Australian equities investments are disclosed on its wehsite ("BT Institutional Australian Sustainability Share Fund" |2004]). Perusal of these investments reveals quite a number of companies that have attracted negative media attention for poor environmental pertormance, especially in the extractive industries.
Funds at the other end ot the spectrum use positive and negative screens in portfolio selection. One such fiind discloses the 35 listed Australian equities it holds (see "Australian Ethical Equities Trust" [2005] ). While the provider ot this tund does otler a number of investment options, it oflers only SR investments. The best-of-sector fund above and this screened fund hold only four equities in common. This overlap is small, especially given that there are only around 1,700 companies listed on the Australian market.
The opportunity tor diversity is significantly lower in Australia than it would be in the U.S., where there are many more listed companies. Why would fund managers ofler such a range of SRI tunds? Cowton [2004, p. 249 [ considers ethical funds to he "retail financial products that specitlcally add social or ethical goals or constraints to normal financial criteria." Products are marketed to attract customers, and the customers ot SRI funds are ethical investors. Viewing SRI tunds as products can help us understand the considerable differences in the investment styles of the screened and bcst-of-sector tunds and why there is demand for both.
Consider a best-ot-sector fund that holds equities m the ethical portfoho that are not significantly ditTerent from those an ordinary fund holds. One would expect the primary difterence between these tunds to be the higher transaction costs associated with holding the ethical fund. So, although the risk-adjusted returns would he similar on hoth porttolios, the ethical investor will receive a lower return net of transaction costs. Bateman, Fraedrich, and Iyer [2001] state that consumers use rule-based {or heuristic) processes when they make decisions that are similar to those made before. Thtis, in a world of mean-variance optimizers (with no hrsttiiiit' investors) who make their investment choices on the basis of risk and return, there would be no demand tor the ethical fund because investors choose the fund with the higher net return. For unfamiliar decision situations, consumers use a cost-benefit (or utilitarian reasoning) process to make the decision. Again, we are left with zero demand tor the ethical tiind because ot lower financial benefits than from the standard tund.
This leads us to ask why investors would support an additional goal in the investment decision. Auger et al. |2OO3] use a structured choice experiment to elicit customer willingness to pay tor the social product features ot soap and running shoes, and tnid some consumers are willing to pay a significantly higher amount for an ethical product. The extent of the ethical premium is related to the demographic characteristics of the participants.
It we view SRI tunds as products, it is reasonable to extend the findings of Auger et al. [2()()3j to SRI funds. Non-wealth motivations for ethical investment are the most likely explanation for the observed demand tor bestot-sector ethical tiinds. To pay higher transaction eosts tor what is essentially the same product, these customers must derive an incremental benetit solely trom the fund s branding as an SR investment.
The incremental benefit is a psychic return (or expressive benefit, in Statman s terms). This psychic return bridges the gap hetween tinancial return and utility. Cullis. Lewis, and Winnett 11992, p. 7| state that the: extent ot ;in individiKirs ethical lnvt'stnient activity IS dependent on the size ot the marginal hcnctits, which may be psychic or more tangible, relative to the marginal costs ot such actions.
Some would argue that an ethical fund that is not substantially ditferent from the market index cannot be counted as an SR investment at all. Sparkes |2()OI, p. 2031 considers that tunds ''not tultilling generally accepted notions of ethics are at least attempting to meet the ethical concerns of the underlying investors." No matter how small the ethical component of the fund's investment selection, there are apparently investors who receive suHicient psychic return to create demand.
Investors willing to purchase best-of-seetor funds tk Cullis, Lewis, and Winnett's detmition of consumptioninvestors-"those who gain direct utility trom investing ethically" 11992, p. 9]. C-onsump tion-investors maybe motivated siniply by tashion; they feel good because they are engaging in an activity tbat is viewed as desirable by their peer group. Ethical investors in this category are motivated by a combination ot financial returns and non-wealth factors.
Investing to Improve the World
Our final proposed motivation for ethical investment is the objective of achieving social change. Those with the objective of achieving social change can be identified as iiu'cstnient-uu'estors. Investment-investors gain their psychic returns indirectly trom the real outcomes of the activities ot the firms in which they invest (CAIIHS, Lewis, and Winnett 11992] Lewis and Mackenzie |2000b] argue that SRI provides a vehicle tor social change. We are unaware of any research that documents systemic social change attributed to SRI tunds. Shareholder activism is increasing in the tlrst-world nations, and has achieved some significant outcome (see "Socially Responsible Investment in Australia 2004"). Rehbein, Waddoek, and Graves [2004] tnid that shareholder activists are most likely to target large companies and cieal with specific issues. While some SRI funds are well placed tor shareholder advocacy with their investments in large firms, fund managers are unlikely to seek or receive consensus on which social issues the investors wish to pursue or with how much vigor such issues should be pursued. Further, Haigh and Hazelton [2004] conclude that the focus of shareholder activism has not been one ot systemic change. They argue that neither shareholder advocacy nor investment in SRI ttinds can induce signiticant corporate change.
While one shareholder alone cannot create social change, shareholders acting in concert with others can. We see this in the tormation of ethical shareholder groups in some large companies (BHP shareholders for social responsibility and Boral green shareholders, for example). This track to achieving social change is unpalatable to some as it involves generating financial return trom the activities they oppose.
An alternative route to social change lies in supporting a non-governmental organization (NGO) to aet on ones behalt. Gtiay, Ooh, and Sinclair J2O04] note the increasing level of activity of NGOs designed to effect social change via investing. Greenpeace, for example, has sought the backing of individual shareholders and ftind managers for resoltitions that reduce environmental damage.
Tlif major dichotomy in these two alternative routes tt) achieving social change is the nuiiiber of social issues that can be addressed by each approach. The SRI fund's objectives could be viewed as achieving some social change across a range ot issues, while the NC'.Os tend to focus on one issue (e.g., Greenpeace and the environment). Thus, the objective of social change is not achieved in a direct sense by investment in an SRI fund, but the joint objectives of hnancial returns and some reduction in damaging corporate activities can be met through SRI tlinds.
We conclude that the main benefits Sl^I fund investors derive from the social change aspect of their investment is one of psychic retnrn-feeling good about not supporting undesirable activities--rather than from any tangible external benefit of making significant change. That is, these investors are motivated by all three of our proposed objectives, and the social change factor is the least important in the decision to invest in an SRI fund.
We find a range of SRI products help to meet the varying levels t)t satisfaction individuals obtain from investing ethically. Our data show considerable heterogeneity in the way ethical investors make investment decisions. We asked respondents if they always consider social factors in their analysis of investments. Ethical aspects were always considered by about 24% of respondents, and never considered by a further 14%, while the majority (62%) considered them sometimes.
We also hnd considerable disparity in judgments of company environmental performance by our respondents. These two questions were structured with open responses to avoid disclosing our opinions. Respondents identified 273 "good" companies and 114 "bad" companies. Many of the companies were rated by only one or two respondents, demonstrating that not all investors looking for environmentally sonnd investments are looking for the same type of thing.
More interesting is the tendency tor some respondents to rate companies as good environmental performers while the same companies are identified as bad performers by more respondents. This phenomenon was particularly strong for mining companies. BHP Billiton, for example, was classified as a good environmental performer by 10 respondents, while 189 thought it was a bad environmental pertbrmer. BHP is held by the best-of-sector sustainability flind discussed earlier, but not by the screened fund. North, Ltd., which through its subsidiary ERA owned a uranium mine whose tailings dam was leaking eflluent into the Kakadu National Park, was rated by 9 respondents as a good environmental performer but bad by another 138.
UTILITY OF ETHICAL INVESTMENT
Ethical investment provides SR investors with more than financial return. Investing in an ethical company or ethical fund is to a certain extent like investing m fine art-ill addition to hnancial returns, the investment yields a fiow of pleasure and even social status.
We can take some tentative first steps toward incorporating this aspect of ethical investing into a theoretical economic framework. There are three ways to approach the task of placing ethical investing within a theoretical economic framework:
1. By treating the psychic returns from ethical investing as equivalent to the gambler's fun of participation. 2. By including the perceived level of ethicality of an investment in the investor's utilit\' function. 3. By treating the psychic returns from ethical investing as equivalent to the happiness or well-being derived from other pleasurable activities. In this case, w'e can make use of the tools developed by researchers on happiness.
Fun of Participation
The psychic returns from ethical investments are somewhat analogous to the/n» of participation that some gamblers may derive from participating in a game of chance. Casual observation reveals that some people who take small gambles (compared to their overall level of wealth) are quite satisfied with the experience, whether they win or lose-winning is an added bonus.
The fun of participating in a fair game generates more utility than would be derived from the financial return on the gamble. The additioiial utility gained from the tun of participation is independent of the outcome of the gamble itself (Markowitz [1952, p. 157J) . In the case of ethical investing, we could say that the utility derived from an ethical investment is the expected financial returns of the risky investment outcomes plus the utility of investing ethically and that the latter is independent of the former.
Assuming that ethical investors display some degree ot risk aversion, simple geometry can be used to display the ethical investor's utility functions. In Exhibit 1, a riskaverse individual with initial wealth W,, faces an investment in a fair game gamble that results in wealth of W-, if won and W, it lost. The utilit\-that the investor derives trom participating in the investment depends on whether the investment is perceived as ethical or unethical. If tht investment cannot be viewed as ethical, the SR investor will derive less utility from the investment than from avoiding it. That is, the tun of participation is negative .md outweighs the expected hnancial return. It the investor receives more utility trom an ethiciil investment than from avoiding the investment, the tun ot participation is positive atid is added to the expected financial payoff.
An important imphcation of this model is that the expected utility of the investment increases, the smaller the amount at stake. Imagine that W^ and WT move inwat\i anci approacli W^|. At the limit, where W, and WT are extremely close to W,,, the expected utility ot the ethical investment is highest. This analysis imphes that the ethical investor experiences more utility, the less motiey is at stake in such investments.
This simple model captures the psychic augmentation to total utility derived by tbe ethical investor independent ot the investment outcome. To determine whether the model has explanatory power-whether it explains some of the observable behavior of ethical investors-we must compare the main prediction ot tbe model with observed beliavior.
The central prediction ot the model is that utilitymaximizing ethical investors will invest nominal sums {compared to their total wealth) in their ethical investments. Tbis does appear to accord with the observed behavior of our sample; about 30% of respondents classity the proportion (jf ethical lnvesttnents in their porttolios at 20% or less. It is also consistent with the U.K. results of Lewis and Mackenzie |2()(H)a] anci Rosen and Sandier 11991] in the U.S. C!)ur tun ot participation model provides a good depiction of tbe consumption-investors' utility tlinction.
where the investor wants to achieve close to a market rate of return with the additional teel-gt)od tactor trom tbe label, ethical investor.
Including Ethical Intensity in the Utility Eunction
A second way to place etbical investment within a theoretical economic traniework is to make an adjustment to the utility function that modern tinance theory usually ascribes to investors. In tinance, tbe standard treatment of investor behavior is to combine expected return and risk (the standard deviation of the possible divergence of acttial investment outcomes trom expected investment outct)mes) in a utility tunctioii:
Because the investor is assumed to like expected return and dislike risk, H^^ has a positive intluence on utility, and <T. j has a negative intluence. In expected returnrisk space, the investor's iiiditference curves are upwardsloping because additional expected return is required to compensate the investor for bearing additional risk. Tbis is depicted in Exbibit 2.
To adapt this partictilar utility contiguration tor t!ie ethical investor, we must insert an additional argument into the utility function. Tbis might be called the dej^ree ofcthicalneis of an investment. Letting e denote the degree of ethicalness of an investment, the utility function for the ethical investor might be stated as:
In this case, the indilFerence map based on this utility function will be described not by curves but by inditference planes. Exhibit 3 displays one such plane in expected return-risk-ethicalness space.
Exbibit 3 depicts the indifference plane of an ethical investor. The individual is indifferent between any two points that lie on this inditlerence plane. It shows the trade-offs the investor is willing to make. In accordance with conventional analysis, the investor demands compensation in the form ot additional expected returns tor bearing additional risk, but tbe investor also takes into accoinit ttie degree of etbicalness ofa partictilar investment. In tbis model, the investor is willing to accept diminished expected returns it the investment is more ethical (even if the risk-return trade-otTtbr ethical invest- If ethical investors are unwilling to make any concessions regarding the ethicalness of their investments, no matter how much additional return they could gain, we remove the trade-offbetween return and ethicalness and make certain parts of the indifference plane off limits. With these changes, it is possible to consider a wide range of behavior under this framework.
For example, investors uninterested in the ethicalness of their investments (14% of respondents in our sample) will inhabit the front edge of the indifference plane, just like the orthodox investor in modern finance. Investment-investors will restrict themselves to parts of the indifference plane that correspond with the level of ethicalness they are willing to accept and the level of ethicalness they can obtain, given the current set of investment options. This is displayed in Exhibit 4.
In Exhibit 4, the orthodox investor who is uninterested in ethicalness again inhabits the edge of the indifference plane (line (I, E). The consumption-investor will lie a litde farther into the plane, but close to the orthodox investor. The investment-investor may choose some minimum level ot ethicalness, say, A. In this case, the relevant portion ot the indifference plane would be tlie area ABCI).
Investors whose objectives fall somewhere between those of consumption-investors and investment-investors may choose some level of ethicalness that they are willing to accept, say, A again. In this case, the relevant portion of the indifference plane will be line AB. It is a simple exercise in geometry to account for a variety of ditTerent combinations.
This model is flexible enough to account for a variety of the observed behaviors of ethical investors. By altering the shape ot the indifference plane, one could consider the actions ot ethical investors who are:
1. Interested in return, risk, and ethicahiess, and are wilhng to make trade-offs among all three (the 62% of our respondents who "sometimes" consider ethical performance in their investment decisions. 2. Interested in rettirn, risk, and ethicalness. but are unwilling to make trade-otTs between return and ethicalness (the 84% of our sample who consider some companies are too bad to invest in). 3. Uninterested in return or risk (NGO activists, for example). For this last possibility we could remove return and risk tVom tht-utility function entirely. In this case, the investor would attempt to maximize the ethicalness of his or her investments (subject to any income or budgetary constraints).
This model is flexible and provides a usefltl framework tor thinking about different types of ethical investors and their behavior. The downside of this particular type of analysis is its abstractncss. It does not shed any light on how to quantify or measure the psychic utility derived from ethical investing. In order to develop that sort of model, we must take a further step away from conventional economic analysis of investor behavior.
Incorporating Happiness into the Model
A more revolutionary way to model the heliavior of ethical investors is through applying some new methods of happiness research. In both the models developed above, the type ot utility under consideration is dirision utility. According Kahneman, Wakker, and Sann [1997, p. 375|, "Decision utilit\' is the weight of an outcome in a decision." This means that investors assess die possible outcomes ot a decision and accord them weights in their investment decision. Decision utility is inferred fi-om observing the choices of economic agents and is then used to explain these choices.
Happiness researchers make use of another type of iitilit\' called e.xpericmril utility. Experienced utility is subjective in nature. It refers to the flow of pleasure (or displeasure) that the individual experiences while engaged in a particular activity. We can use this experienced utility concept in our attempt to place ethical investing within a theoretical economic framework.
One particular advantage of experienced utility is that it may be measured directly and does not have to be inferred from observation of investor behavior. Recent advances in measuring experienced utility have been found to yield accurate and consistent results (see Kahneman et al. |2l )()4]). One measure of experienced utility that may be particularly useful for research into the behavior of ethical investors is net affective experience.
Net affective experience is the name given to the result generated by a survey sort of instrument deployed to extract a measure of the well-being that individuals attribute to various activities and events. To obtain a value tor net affective experience, psychologists use a technique called the experience sampling method (ESM).
According to Kahneman et al. |2(HI4, p. 4311: ESM is carried our by supplying subjects with an electronic diary (e.g. A specially programmed Palm Pilot) that beeps at nindotn times of the day and asks
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respondents to describe what they were doingjust before thf prompt. The electronic diary also asks respondents to indicate the intensity of various feelings (e.g., happy, frustrated...). These may be averaged to produce a metric reflecting actual daily experience . . . Net affective experience is defined as the average of the positive adjectives less the average of the negative adjectives, for individuals engaged in each activity.
The key problem is of course how to incorporate these ideas into a model of ethical investor behavior. Actually, the problem is solved quite easily. Assume first that ethical investments yield their owners a flow of pleasure (happiness, psychic return, or experienced utility) over time, and that that How of pleasure is measured by net affective experience. The utility derived fioni this fiow of pleasure over the course of the investment is equal to the sum of the product of the investment period and the net affective experience associated with the ownership of the ethical investment:
where It is the amount of time an individual ( is engaged in a particular activity /, and fU is the net affective experience of activity /' (see Kahneman et al. [2004, p. 432] ). Now assume that, besides this flow of pleasure, the individual also derives ntility from the expected return associated with the invescment and disiililily from the risk associated with the investment. In accordance with standard analysis, this part of the utility derived from the investment can be represented by a quadratic function of the form:
where £" anci (!"-denote the expected financial return and the variance of returns, respectively; h is a parameter that adheres to the restriction -1 < /) < 0 when investors are risk-averse; and r is a parameter that adheres to the restriction 0 < c < 1 (see Tobin [1958, p. 76 [ for some caveats associated with the use of this particular quadratic function). The total utility, U., derived from an ethical investment may therefore be represented by a function that aggregates both the experienced and decision utility associated with the ethical investment:
,, + 1(1 + h)E, + hE,' -
THE JOURNAL OF INVESTINC^This tuncdon is derived by assuming that the ethical investor wishes to maximize utihty. Total utihty is represented by a quadratic function of the rate of return on the investment with declining marginal ui'ilky plus the net affective experience during the period of ethical investment. For those who are unconcerned with the risk and return of the investment, the function reduces to Equation (3). For the orthodox investor uninterested in ethics, tlie Hinction reduces to Equation (4).
Variations in the level of ethical intensity will he accounted for somewhere between these two extremes by Equation (5). This tlinction captures the essential characteristics of ethical investing as an economic behavior. Furthermore, the subjective utihty derived from the ethical investment, identified here as experienced utility, can be measured and quantified. Hence, our first steps toward a theoretical economic framework for ethical investing have led us to a combination of psychology' and happiness research with orthodox financial economics.
SUMMARY
We have pniposed three motivations for ethical investment: financial returns, non-wealth returns, and social change. These motives arc neither exhaustive nor exclusive, and one single motive will not explaiii the behavior of all ethical investors.
The requirement of a financial return is necessary for an activity to be considered an investment, but there may be a trade-ort between tinancial and psychic returns tor some investors. 71ie trade-off for consumptioninvestors is expected to be close to zero (total utility is maximized with low levels of ethical investment in the fun of participation model) and is expected to vary with the ethical intensity of investment-investors, as shown when we include ethical intensity in the investor's utility function. Psychic return can also be viewed as an increase in happiness, an approach that would lend itself to empirical testing to improve our understanding of why we invest ethically.
